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The aim of this research is to provide a model for optimising the sectoral portfolio selection by using game theory during 
a general elections phase. We select stocks from Bursa Malaysia and calculate the payoff for each stock and its coalition 
sectors by averaging returns. The value of the game is at the same time the characteristic function of a multiple-player 
game which will be applied to obtain the Shapley value using the cooperative game theory approach for finding the 
optimal increment of the returns. We also compare the Shapley value percentages obtained for both periods of the 13
th
 
Malaysia General Election (GE13) and 14
th
 Malaysia General Election (GE14) to indicate the impact of GE14 on 
investment. This research will lead to optimal portfolio selection before and after an election. 
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An investment is the present commitment of 
money or other assets in the anticipation of reaping long 
term benefits in the future [1]. An investment portfolio 
is a collection of investment assets owned by investors. 
These investors can either be individual investors or 
institutional investors. The financial market is a trading 
marketplace that involves securities like equities, bonds 
and derivatives. The stock market encourages investors 
to allocate their capital in firms that have convincing 
prospects. A general election is an example of a volatile 
situation that affects investments. This research focuses 
on comparing the sectoral changes before and after 
general elections in Malaysia to determine their impact, 
if any. 
 
Malaysia has undergone 14 episodes of general 
elections up to 2018. Before the 14
th
 General Election, 
the Barisan Nasional coalition had won all 13 previous 
elections. The last two general elections (GE13 and 
GE14) saw a particularly close competition between 
Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat which resulted in 
a higher chance for Pakatan Rakyat to win the election. 
After the dissolution of the Pakatan Rakyat, a new party 
was formed known as the Pakatan Harapan. Pakatan 
Harapan ultimately won a simple majority in parliament 
to form a new government in 2018. During the general 
elections in 2008 and 2013, fluctuations in the market 
showed that political uncertainty has a significance 
influence. However, the general election years of 1995, 
1999 and 2004 showed that it had no effect on stock 
market returns [2]. 
 
The decision in constructing a sectoral 
portfolio is the choice of which securities to hold within 
each asset class. The allocation of financial assets is a 
problem faced by investors in the country as they need 
to choose their optimal portfolios to maintain a good 
performance in the financial markets especially pre and 
post general elections. The investor’s objective is 
choosing a portfolio that can maximise returns at certain 
risk conditions especially during elections and perform 
it in abundant in type and number instead of choosing 
the best investment options individually which may be 
subject to more risk conditions. 
 
As financial markets are highly competitive, 
investors will find ways to increase their gains. One of 
the methods is by diversifying their assets. 
Diversification means that various assets are held in the 
portfolio. Diversifying investments leads to a higher 
expected return and lower standard deviations. In the 
classical way, investors believe that putting several 
stocks in their portfolio will lead to a decrease in risk 
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As suggested by the classical approach, 
investors should invest in many types of stocks that 
have higher expected returns at a given level of risk and 
will cooperate to perform better in the market. Since 
various approaches have been studied to solve the 
investment portfolio selection problem, this uncertainty 
was also studied by Harry Markowitz [3] in 1952, 
where his article titled Portfolio Selection brought up 
the modern portfolio theory that an investment’s return 
and risk should not be calculated alone but by using an 
overview of the entire portfolio. 
 
There are two fundamental characteristics in 
the financial market, the first is competition among 
market players and the second is uncertainty. This 
means that a player’s game will be affected by the other 
players’ total market performance behaviour with the 
uncertainty conditions of the financial market. Based on 
these two essential fundamental characteristics, it can 
be implemented in the game theory part that refers to 
the optimal decision making by players in evaluating 
and calculating the payoff of other players by using 
mathematics. 
 
Game theory can be divided into two 
categories; noncooperative and cooperative games. A 
cooperative game is a kind of game in which there are 
binding agreements among players that unite together to 
achieve a higher payoff instead of acting individually. 
In this research, the considerations are sectors as 
players and the cooperation between sectors to 
maximise their collective payoffs. Therefore, this 
cooperative game approach can be used to compare the 





general elections. Hence, the main problem of the 
research is to provide a model for optimising the 
sectoral portfolio selection by using game theory during 
a general elections phase. 
 
The findings of this research will contribute to 
the game theory study in Malaysia, especially during 
political changes. This research also gives contribution 
in investment theory field on how to suggest a sectoral 




Game theory is one of the mathematical tools 
that has been used in determining the competitiveness 
between players. It comes with a formal analytical 
framework and a number of mathematical instruments 
to study the complex intersections among rational 
players [4]. A player’s behaviour in choosing a strategy 
will depend on the other players’ selection of strategies. 
All the chosen strategies not only give positive or 
negative payoffs individually but also influences the 
other players’ payoffs simultaneously. 
 
There are two types of games: cooperative 
game or non-cooperative game. Non-cooperative game 
is a game where the players make a decision on their 
own strategies to maximise their payoff. This 
representation of game can be seen as players in the 
market with conflicts of interests that influence each 
other. Cooperative game is a game that has binding 
agreements among players through agreements or 
negotiations. Since the games basically are played 
under uncertainty and risky conditions, there are some 
aspects in common between financial markets and the 
games. 
 
The investor and the market can be two players 
opposed to each other in the market. This idea can be 
modelled in a zero-sum game. The condition of the 
market is not solely dependent on the overall market 
since there are some other factors such as political and 
economic conditions, and social behaviour changes in 
the market. 
 
There are indications that show the strong 
relationship between political stability and stock market 
performance. The hypothesis on the effect of political 
elections on the stock market has been studied by a 
number of papers with significant findings which reflect 
the economic performance of the country. There was a 
study by Floros [5] on the influence of Greece’s 
political elections on the Athens Stock Exchange by 
using the ordinary least squares models on the pre-
election and post-election periods. 
 
In addition, the findings of Abidin et al., [6] 
provide evidence that there is no election effect on New 
Zealand’s stock market except in 2002, where there was 
an increment in market returns after the election rather 
than prior to the election. However, there was an 
election effect on the political cycle when the nominal 
returns on the market index increased when the 
National Party formed the government seats in contrast 
to the situation during a Labour Party victory. Smales 
[7] examined the effect of the Australian federal 
election cycle’s political uncertainty on the financial 
market uncertainty. The empirical results showed that 
the Australian election uncertainty has a significant 
effect on financial market uncertainty. 
 
A paper written by Lehkonen and Heimonen 
[8] examined the effects of democracy and political risk 
on the stock market. There is significant evidence that 
the stock market returns of 49 emerging countries are 
affected by political uncertainty. A previous study 
showed that there was a significant election effect on 





 general elections [9]. In addition, another paper 
by Liew and Rowland [2] found that each election had a 
different effect on the daily returns of the FBMKLCI 
for every election studied in their research. In 40% of 
the time the stock market reacted positively before the 
elections, whereas 60% of the time the market reacted 
positively after the elections. Chavali et al., [10] 
Examined the effect of elections on the stock market 
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and analysed the market reaction towards the same 
political party wins for the second time. They used 
market model event study with sample period from 
2014 to 2019 that involved 31 companies listed in 
Bombay Stock Exchange. In years 2014 and 2019, an 
event window of 82 days was taken with 39 days prior 
to the event and 42 days post event and 83 days was 
taken with 41 days prior to the event and 41 days post 
event respectively. The findings revealed that even the 
same political party wins for the second time, the 
impact on the stock market is not same between any 
two elections. 
 
Most of the previous studies used statistical 
analysis and were unable to suggest which sectors 
showed changes during both phases. In addition, Habip 
Kocak [11] conducted a research on the portfolio 
partnership optimality return. The results showed that 
the return was allocated according to the weight of each 
stock in the portfolio using the method of Shapley value 
by scaling the payoffs to avoid negative return values. 
Tataei et al., [12] investigated ways of maximising the 
outcome of the player and the model of optimal 
portfolio selection using the cooperative game theory 
by shifting the payoff to avoid negative values. The 
study found that the proposed portfolio by using 
cooperative game theory had a better performance most 
of the time as they try to defeat the market through 
coalition. Nesrin Ozkan [13] examined portfolio 
optimisation in Borsa Istanbul by using a game 
theoretic approach to analyse the relative performances 
of sectoral portfolios. He found that the model can be 
used in portfolio optimisation since the technology 
sector has the highest return with the lowest portfolio 
concentration and its relative performance is higher 
compared to the other sectors in the research. Slišković 
& Škrinjarić [14] also used Shapley value solution 
concept to evaluate the risk of each individual asset in a 
portfolio by using the Zagreb Stock Exchange data. The 
risk used as a cost needs to be divided fairly among 
individual asset that depends on the contribution to total 
risk of a portfolio. 
 
Recently, cooperative game has enticed 
interest with its ability to guide investors’ preference on 
investment options with different risk groups. 
Therefore, this study will use the game theory approach 
with significant results on sector allocation. Based on 
this, the research will be focusing on the changes which 
occurred before and after the Malaysian general 
elections where Pakatan Harapan won while studying 
the sectoral changes in the FBM30. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The Financial Times Stock Exchange Bursa 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (FBMKLCI) 
is the largest stock exchange in Malaysia. The 
FBMKLCI is a share index of the 30 companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia with the highest market 
capitalisation. The data used in this study only consists 
of daily closing price returns of 14 stocks included in 
the FBMKLCI. All the data are obtained from 
Datastream. 
 
The aim of this research is to observe three 
sectoral portfolio changes before and after the general 
elections that will be generated by the Shapley value 
solution concept in Bursa Malaysia. The first three main 
sectors in FBMKLCI that maintain the groups listed 
during GE13 and GE14 are financial services sector, 
consumer products and services sector, and 
telecommunications and media sector. The analysis is 
run for a period of six months before and after the 
general elections. 
 
Table-1: Study period 
General Election 13 Period Date Trading Day 
Before 1/11/2012 – 3/5/2013 132 
After 6/5/2013 – 29/11/2013 150 
General Election 14 Period Date Trading Day 
Before 1/11/2017 – 8/5/2018 135 
After 10/5/2018 – 30/11/2018 147 
 
There are three sectors involve which are determined as 
follows: 
A : Financial services 
B : Consumer products and services 
C : Telecommunications and media 
 
The nature player (FBMKLCI) has two strategies which 
are determined as follows: 
P1 : Period before general election 
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Table-2: Players and strategies 
Players/Sectors Strategies Name Code 
Player A : Financial Services A1 AMMB Holdings Berhad 1015.KL 
A2 CIMB Group Holdings Berhad 1023.KL 
A3 Hong Leong Bank Berhad 5819.KL 
A4 Hong Leong Financial Berhad 1082.KL 
A5 Malayan Banking Berhad 1155.KL 
A6 Public Bank Berhad 1295.KL 
A7 RHB Capital Berhad 1066.KL 
Player B : Consumer Products and Services B1 PPB Group Bhd 4065.KL 
B2 Genting Bhd 3182.KL 
B3 Genting Malaysia Bhd 4715.KL 
B4 Petronas Dagangan Bhd 5681.KL 
Player C : Telecommunications and Media C1 Axiata Group Berhad 6888.KL 
C2 Digi.Com Berhad 6947.KL 
C3 Maxis Berhad 6012.KL 
 
This research follows the methodology applied 
in Kocak’s paper [11] in applying cooperative game 
theory approach towards sectoral portfolio selection. 
The model of this research is zero sum game where the 
players are between investors and the stock market, and 
a cooperative game in a static game model. The daily 
prices of each stock is used to calculate the return of 
each stock. The returns are expressed in logarithmic 
form as follows: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡−1) ……………… (1) 
 
Where, 
𝑅𝑡 is the daily return of the stock at time  , 
𝑃𝑡 is the daily stock price at time  , 
𝑃𝑡−1 is the daily stock price at time  −  . 
 







 …………………………… (2) 
 
Where, 
?̅? is the average return, 
𝑅𝑡 is the daily return of the stock, 
𝑛 is the number of trading days. 
 
The return prices for each stock are calculated 
by using equation (1) and the average returns are 
formed from equation (2). The average returns have 
positive and negative returns. Hence, to avoid negative 
payoff values during the cooperation calculation in the 
Shapley value solution concept, all the values are 
shifted in the payoff matrices for all sectors, by 
subtracting them with the minimum value among all 
sectors. The shifted average return values are then 
evaluated in Production and Operations Management – 
Quantitative Methods (POM - QM) for Windows 
software to get the value of games. 
 
Mathematical Model of Cooperative Game 
A characteristic function game is given by a 
pair (   ), where   is the total number of players and 
    , -    is a characteristic function which maps 
every coalition of players to a payoff. Let   be the each 
cooperation in   and define  ( ) as the value obtained 
from the cooperation. The cooperation formed at least 
has to guarantee that the values that are obtained by 
coalitions, defined as superadditivity therefore 
increasing payoff. The worth of the cooperative is equal 
to at least the worth of each of them acting alone. 
Superadditivity is defined as follows: 
 
 ( 1    )  {   
| 1   | (  )   1   ( 1)  (  )   1   (  ) }   1           1    =   
 ( 1    )   ( 1)   (  )   1           1    =   
 
The values obtained from the cooperation will 
be distributed by using Shapley value to observe the 
changes occuring before and after both general 
elections. Let   ( ) be the Shapley value of player  . 
The Shapley value equation is as follows: 
 
  ( ) = ∑
( −| |)!(| |−1)!
 !
, ( ) −  ( \* +)-        …………… (3) 
 
and Shapley vector is as follows: 
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The values of the game that obtained from 
(POM - QM) for Windows software are distributed by 
using Shapley value equation (3) to evaluate the 
expected marginal contribution for each sector. The 
value of the game is then used to get the percentages 
allocation to each sector during GE13 and GE14. 
 
The payoff matrices below are divided into 




 general election. 
 
Table-3: Payoff matrix structured for player A 
 P1 P2 
A1 1.36E-03 1.80E-03 
A2 1.05E-03 1.05E-03 
A3 8.72E-04 9.86E-04 
A4 2.36E-03 1.29E-03 
A5 1.53E-03 1.20E-03 
A6 1.28E-03 1.86E-03 
A7 1.94E-03 4.05E-04 
 
Table-4: Payoff matrix structured for player B 
 P1 P2 
B1 5.71E-04 2.17E-03 
B2 1.99E-03 1.22E-03 
B3 1.18E-03 2.09E-03 
B4 1.45E-03 3.05E-03 
 
Table-5: Payoff matrix structured for player C 
 P1 P2 
C1 1.15E-03 1.19E-03 
C2 0.00E+00 1.44E-03 
C3 8.39E-04 1.34E-03 
 
The payoff matrices above are solved in QM 
for Windows software, the values of game are as follow 
 (*𝐴+) = 0.00 66  (*𝐵+) = 0.00 8   (*𝐶+) = 0.00  5 
 
The payoff matrices for coalitions formed by 
players A and B, players A and C, players B and C and 
players A, B and C are given below. 
 
Table-6: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A and B 
 P1 P2 
A1B1 1.93E-03 3.97E-03 
A1B2 3.35E-03 3.03E-03 
A1B3 2.54E-03 3.89E-03 
A1B4 2.81E-03 4.85E-03 
A2B1 1.62E-03 3.22E-03 
A2B2 3.04E-03 2.27E-03 
A2B3 2.23E-03 3.13E-03 
A2B4 2.50E-03 4.09E-03 
A3B1 1.44E-03 3.16E-03 
A3B2 2.86E-03 2.21E-03 
A3B3 2.05E-03 3.07E-03 
A3B4 2.32E-03 4.03E-03 
A4B1 2.93E-03 3.46E-03 
A4B2 4.35E-03 2.52E-03 
A4B3 3.54E-03 3.38E-03 
A4B4 3.81E-03 4.34E-03 
A5B1 2.10E-03 3.37E-03 
A5B2 3.52E-03 2.42E-03 
A5B3 2.70E-03 3.29E-03 
A5B4 2.97E-03 4.25E-03 
A6B1 1.85E-03 4.03E-03 
A6B2 3.27E-03 3.08E-03 
A6B3 2.45E-03 3.94E-03 
A6B4 2.72E-03 4.90E-03 
A7B1 2.51E-03 2.58E-03 
A7B2 3.93E-03 1.63E-03 
A7B3 3.11E-03 2.49E-03 
A7B4 3.38E-03 3.45E-03 
 
Table-7: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A and C 
 P1 P2 
A1C1 2.51E-03 2.99E-03 
A1C2 1.36E-03 3.24E-03 
A1C3 2.20E-03 3.15E-03 
A2C1 2.20E-03 2.24E-03 
A2C2 1.05E-03 2.48E-03 
A2C3 1.89E-03 2.39E-03 
A3C1 2.02E-03 2.18E-03 
A3C2 8.72E-04 2.42E-03 
A3C3 1.71E-03 2.33E-03 
A4C1 3.52E-03 2.48E-03 
A4C2 2.36E-03 2.73E-03 
A4C3 3.20E-03 2.64E-03 
A5C1 2.68E-03 2.39E-03 
A5C2 1.53E-03 2.64E-03 
A5C3 2.37E-03 2.54E-03 
A6C1 2.43E-03 3.05E-03 
A6C2 1.28E-03 3.29E-03 
A6C3 2.12E-03 3.20E-03 
A7C1 3.09E-03 1.60E-03 
A7C2 1.94E-03 1.84E-03 
A7C3 2.78E-03 1.75E-03 
 
Table-8: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players B and C 
 P1 P2 
B1C1 1.72E-03 3.36E-03 
B1C2 5.71E-04 3.61E-03 
B1C3 1.41E-03 3.51E-03 
B2C1 3.14E-03 2.41E-03 
B2C2 1.99E-03 2.66E-03 
B2C3 2.83E-03 2.56E-03 
B3C1 2.33E-03 3.28E-03 
B3C2 1.18E-03 3.52E-03 
B3C3 2.01E-03 3.43E-03 
B4C1 2.60E-03 4.24E-03 
B4C2 1.45E-03 4.48E-03 
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Table-9: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A, B and C 
 P1 P2 
A1B1C1 3.08E-03 5.17E-03 
A1B1C2 1.93E-03 5.41E-03 
A1B1C3 2.77E-03 5.32E-03 
A1B2C1 4.50E-03 4.22E-03 
A1B2C2 3.35E-03 4.46E-03 
A1B2C3 4.19E-03 4.37E-03 
A1B3C1 3.69E-03 5.08E-03 
A1B3C2 2.54E-03 5.33E-03 
A1B3C3 3.38E-03 5.23E-03 
A1B4C1 3.96E-03 6.04E-03 
A1B4C2 2.81E-03 6.29E-03 
A1B4C3 3.65E-03 6.19E-03 
A2B1C1 2.77E-03 4.41E-03 
A2B1C2 1.62E-03 4.65E-03 
A2B1C3 2.46E-03 4.56E-03 
A2B2C1 4.19E-03 3.46E-03 
A2B2C2 3.04E-03 3.70E-03 
A2B2C3 3.88E-03 3.61E-03 
A2B3C1 3.38E-03 4.32E-03 
A2B3C2 2.23E-03 4.57E-03 
A2B3C3 3.07E-03 4.48E-03 
A2B4C1 3.65E-03 5.28E-03 
A2B4C2 2.50E-03 5.53E-03 
A2B4C3 3.34E-03 5.43E-03 
A3B1C1 2.59E-03 4.35E-03 
A3B1C2 1.44E-03 4.59E-03 
A3B1C3 2.28E-03 4.50E-03 
A3B2C1 4.01E-03 3.40E-03 
A3B2C2 2.86E-03 3.65E-03 
A3B2C3 3.70E-03 3.55E-03 
A3B3C1 3.20E-03 4.27E-03 
A3B3C2 2.05E-03 4.51E-03 
A3B3C3 2.89E-03 4.42E-03 
A3B4C1 3.47E-03 5.22E-03 
A3B4C2 2.32E-03 5.47E-03 
A3B4C3 3.16E-03 5.37E-03 
A4B1C1 4.09E-03 4.66E-03 
A4B1C2 2.93E-03 4.90E-03 
A4B1C3 3.77E-03 4.81E-03 
A4B2C1 5.50E-03 3.71E-03 
A4B2C2 4.35E-03 3.95E-03 
A4B2C3 5.19E-03 3.86E-03 
A4B3C1 4.69E-03 4.57E-03 
A4B3C2 3.54E-03 4.82E-03 
A4B3C3 4.38E-03 4.72E-03 
A4B4C1 4.96E-03 5.53E-03 
A4B4C2 3.81E-03 5.78E-03 
A4B4C3 4.65E-03 5.68E-03 
A5B1C1 3.25E-03 4.56E-03 
A5B1C2 2.10E-03 4.81E-03 
A5B1C3 2.94E-03 4.71E-03 
A5B2C1 4.67E-03 3.62E-03 
A5B2C2 3.52E-03 3.86E-03 
A5B2C3 4.35E-03 3.77E-03 
A5B3C1 3.85E-03 4.48E-03 
A5B3C2 2.70E-03 4.73E-03 
A5B3C3 3.54E-03 4.63E-03 
A5B4C1 4.12E-03 5.44E-03 
A5B4C2 2.97E-03 5.68E-03 
A5B4C3 3.81E-03 5.59E-03 
A6B1C1 3.00E-03 5.22E-03 
A6B1C2 1.85E-03 5.46E-03 
A6B1C3 2.69E-03 5.37E-03 
A6B2C1 4.42E-03 4.27E-03 
A6B2C2 3.27E-03 4.51E-03 
A6B2C3 4.11E-03 4.42E-03 
A6B3C1 3.60E-03 5.13E-03 
A6B3C2 2.45E-03 5.38E-03 
A6B3C3 3.29E-03 5.29E-03 
A6B4C1 3.88E-03 6.09E-03 
A6B4C2 2.72E-03 6.34E-03 
A6B4C3 3.56E-03 6.24E-03 
A7B1C1 3.66E-03 3.77E-03 
A7B1C2 2.51E-03 4.01E-03 
A7B1C3 3.35E-03 3.92E-03 
A7B2C1 5.08E-03 2.82E-03 
A7B2C2 3.93E-03 3.06E-03 
A7B2C3 4.77E-03 2.97E-03 
A7B3C1 4.27E-03 3.68E-03 
A7B3C2 3.11E-03 3.93E-03 
A7B3C3 3.95E-03 3.83E-03 
A7B4C1 4.54E-03 4.64E-03 
A7B4C2 3.38E-03 4.89E-03 
A7B4C3 4.22E-03 4.79E-03 
 
The optimal game values are obtained as follow: 
 (*𝐴 𝐵+) = 0.00 9   (*𝐴 𝐶+) = 0.00 8   (*𝐵 𝐶+)
= 0.00 97  (*𝐴 𝐵 𝐶+) = 0.00509 
 
Based on the values of the game from the 
payoff matrices in Tables 3 to 9, the characteristic 
functions are calculated and tabulated in Table-10. The 
characteristic funcions of the game designed for 
coalitions among player A, player B and player C are 
shown in the table below: 
 
Table-10: Characteristic function 
Characteristic Function Value 
 (* +) 0.00000 
 (*𝐴+) 0.00166 
 (*𝐵+) 0.00181 
 (*𝐶+) 0.00115 
 (*𝐴𝐵+) 0.00393 
 (*𝐴𝐶+) 0.00284 
 (*𝐵𝐶+) 0.00297 
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Table-11: Payoff matrix structured for player A 
 P1 P2 
A1 2.80E-03 4.76E-03 
A2 4.71E-03 2.61E-03 
A3 4.99E-03 4.46E-03 
A4 4.79E-03 3.95E-03 
A5 4.92E-03 2.95E-03 
A6 4.99E-03 4.13E-03 
A7 4.11E-03 3.81E-03 
 
Table-12: Payoff matrix structured for player B 
 P1 P2 
B1 4.82E-03 4.50E-03 
B2 3.46E-03 1.70E-03 
B3 3.84E-03 0.00E+00 
B4 4.56E-03 3.68E-03 
 
Table-13: Payoff matrix structured for player C 
 P1 P2 
C1 3.70E-03 1.28E-03 
C2 3.22E-03 3.29E-03 
C3 3.27E-03 3.74E-03 
 
The payoff matrices above are solved in QM 
for Windows software, the values of game are as 
follows: 
 (*𝐴+) = 0.00 5   (*𝐵+) = 0.00 5  (*𝐶+) = 0.00    
 
The payoff matrices for coalitions formed by 
players A and B, players A and C, players B and C and 
players A, B and C are given below. 
 
Table-14: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A and B 
 P1 P2 
A1B1 7.63E-03 9.27E-03 
A1B2 6.27E-03 6.46E-03 
A1B3 6.64E-03 4.76E-03 
A1B4 7.36E-03 8.45E-03 
A2B1 9.53E-03 7.12E-03 
A2B2 8.17E-03 4.31E-03 
A2B3 8.55E-03 2.61E-03 
A2B4 9.26E-03 6.30E-03 
A3B1 9.82E-03 8.96E-03 
A3B2 8.45E-03 6.16E-03 
A3B3 8.83E-03 4.46E-03 
A3B4 9.55E-03 8.14E-03 
A4B1 9.61E-03 8.45E-03 
A4B2 8.25E-03 5.65E-03 
A4B3 8.63E-03 3.95E-03 
A4B4 9.35E-03 7.63E-03 
A5B1 9.74E-03 7.46E-03 
A5B2 8.38E-03 4.65E-03 
A5B3 8.76E-03 2.95E-03 
A5B4 9.48E-03 6.64E-03 
A6B1 9.81E-03 8.63E-03 
A6B2 8.45E-03 5.83E-03 
A6B3 8.83E-03 4.13E-03 
A6B4 9.54E-03 7.82E-03 
A7B1 8.94E-03 8.32E-03 
A7B2 7.58E-03 5.52E-03 
A7B3 7.95E-03 3.81E-03 
A7B4 8.67E-03 7.50E-03 
 
Table-15: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A and C 
 P1 P2 
A1C1 6.50E-03 6.04E-03 
A1C2 6.03E-03 8.05E-03 
A1C3 6.07E-03 8.50E-03 
A2C1 8.41E-03 3.89E-03 
A2C2 7.93E-03 5.90E-03 
A2C3 7.98E-03 6.35E-03 
A3C1 8.69E-03 5.73E-03 
A3C2 8.22E-03 7.74E-03 
A3C3 8.26E-03 8.20E-03 
A4C1 8.49E-03 5.23E-03 
A4C2 8.01E-03 7.23E-03 
A4C3 8.06E-03 7.69E-03 
A5C1 8.62E-03 4.23E-03 
A5C2 8.14E-03 6.24E-03 
A5C3 8.19E-03 6.69E-03 
A6C1 8.69E-03 5.41E-03 
A6C2 8.21E-03 7.42E-03 
A6C3 8.26E-03 7.87E-03 
A7C1 7.81E-03 5.09E-03 
A7C2 7.34E-03 7.10E-03 
A7C3 7.38E-03 7.56E-03 
 
Table-16: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players B and C 
 P1 P2 
B1C1 8.53E-03 5.78E-03 
B1C2 8.05E-03 7.79E-03 
B1C3 8.10E-03 8.24E-03 
B2C1 7.17E-03 2.98E-03 
B2C2 6.69E-03 4.99E-03 
B2C3 6.73E-03 5.44E-03 
B3C1 7.54E-03 1.28E-03 
B3C2 7.06E-03 3.29E-03 
B3C3 7.11E-03 3.74E-03 
B4C1 8.26E-03 4.96E-03 
B4C2 7.78E-03 6.97E-03 
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Table-17: Payoff matrix structured for coalition of 
players A, B and C 
 P1 P2 
A1B1C1 1.13E-02 1.05E-02 
A1B1C2 1.08E-02 1.26E-02 
A1B1C3 1.09E-02 1.30E-02 
A1B2C1 9.97E-03 7.74E-03 
A1B2C2 9.49E-03 9.75E-03 
A1B2C3 9.54E-03 1.02E-02 
A1B3C1 1.03E-02 6.04E-03 
A1B3C2 9.87E-03 8.05E-03 
A1B3C3 9.91E-03 8.50E-03 
A1B4C1 1.11E-02 9.73E-03 
A1B4C2 1.06E-02 1.17E-02 
A1B4C3 1.06E-02 1.22E-02 
A2B1C1 1.32E-02 8.39E-03 
A2B1C2 1.28E-02 1.04E-02 
A2B1C3 1.28E-02 1.09E-02 
A2B2C1 1.19E-02 5.59E-03 
A2B2C2 1.14E-02 7.60E-03 
A2B2C3 1.14E-02 8.06E-03 
A2B3C1 1.22E-02 3.89E-03 
A2B3C2 1.18E-02 5.90E-03 
A2B3C3 1.18E-02 6.35E-03 
A2B4C1 1.30E-02 7.58E-03 
A2B4C2 1.25E-02 9.58E-03 
A2B4C3 1.25E-02 1.00E-02 
A3B1C1 1.35E-02 1.02E-02 
A3B1C2 1.30E-02 1.22E-02 
A3B1C3 1.31E-02 1.27E-02 
A3B2C1 1.22E-02 7.44E-03 
A3B2C2 1.17E-02 9.44E-03 
A3B2C3 1.17E-02 9.90E-03 
A3B3C1 1.25E-02 5.73E-03 
A3B3C2 1.21E-02 7.74E-03 
A3B3C3 1.21E-02 8.20E-03 
A3B4C1 1.33E-02 9.42E-03 
A3B4C2 1.28E-02 1.14E-02 
A3B4C3 1.28E-02 1.19E-02 
A4B1C1 1.33E-02 9.73E-03 
A4B1C2 1.28E-02 1.17E-02 
A4B1C3 1.29E-02 1.22E-02 
A4B2C1 1.20E-02 6.93E-03 
A4B2C2 1.15E-02 8.94E-03 
A4B2C3 1.15E-02 9.39E-03 
A4B3C1 1.23E-02 5.23E-03 
A4B3C2 1.19E-02 7.23E-03 
A4B3C3 1.19E-02 7.69E-03 
A4B4C1 1.31E-02 8.91E-03 
A4B4C2 1.26E-02 1.09E-02 
A4B4C3 1.26E-02 1.14E-02 
A5B1C1 1.34E-02 8.73E-03 
A5B1C2 1.30E-02 1.07E-02 
A5B1C3 1.30E-02 1.12E-02 
A5B2C1 1.21E-02 5.93E-03 
A5B2C2 1.16E-02 7.94E-03 
A5B2C3 1.17E-02 8.40E-03 
A5B3C1 1.25E-02 4.23E-03 
A5B3C2 1.20E-02 6.24E-03 
A5B3C3 1.20E-02 6.69E-03 
A5B4C1 1.32E-02 7.92E-03 
A5B4C2 1.27E-02 9.92E-03 
A5B4C3 1.28E-02 1.04E-02 
A6B1C1 1.35E-02 9.91E-03 
A6B1C2 1.30E-02 1.19E-02 
A6B1C3 1.31E-02 1.24E-02 
A6B2C1 1.22E-02 7.11E-03 
A6B2C2 1.17E-02 9.12E-03 
A6B2C3 1.17E-02 9.57E-03 
A6B3C1 1.25E-02 5.41E-03 
A6B3C2 1.20E-02 7.42E-03 
A6B3C3 1.21E-02 7.87E-03 
A6B4C1 1.32E-02 9.09E-03 
A6B4C2 1.28E-02 1.11E-02 
A6B4C3 1.28E-02 1.16E-02 
A7B1C1 1.26E-02 9.60E-03 
A7B1C2 1.22E-02 1.16E-02 
A7B1C3 1.22E-02 1.21E-02 
A7B2C1 1.13E-02 6.80E-03 
A7B2C2 1.08E-02 8.80E-03 
A7B2C3 1.08E-02 9.26E-03 
A7B3C1 1.17E-02 5.09E-03 
A7B3C2 1.12E-02 7.10E-03 
A7B3C3 1.12E-02 7.56E-03 
A7B4C1 1.24E-02 8.78E-03 
A7B4C2 1.19E-02 1.08E-02 
A7B4C3 1.19E-02 1.12E-02 
 
The optimal game values are obtained as follow: 
 (*𝐴 𝐵+) = 0.00907  (*𝐴 𝐶+) = 0.008    (*𝐵 𝐶+)
= 0.008    (*𝐴 𝐵 𝐶+) = 0.0  75 
 
Based on the value of the game from the 
payoff matrices in Tables 11 to 17, the characteristic 
functions are calculated and tabulated in Table-18. The 
characteristic funcions of the game designed for 
coalitions among player A, player B and player C are 
shown in the table below: 
 
Table-18: Characteristic function 
Characteristic Function Value 
 (* +) 0.00000 
 (*𝐴+) 0.00452 
 (*𝐵+) 0.00450 
 (*𝐶+) 0.00334 
 (*𝐴𝐵+) 0.00907 
 (*𝐴𝐶+) 0.00821 
 (*𝐵𝐶+) 0.00812 
 (*𝐴𝐵𝐶+) 0.01275 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The characteristic functions from Table-10 and 
Table-18 are substituted into Shapley value equation (3) 
to obtain the marginal contribution for each stock. The 
marginal contribution for each player, on average, 
increases the payoff. This shows the bargaining value 
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for each player to join the coalitions. The results are in 





 general election 
   (0.00 895 0.00 0 5 0.00  6) 
 
The results for Shapley value for player A 
(financial services sector), player B (consumer products 
and services sector) and player C (telecommunications 
and media sector) are 0.001895, 0.002035 and 0.00116 
respectively. As normalisation of the Shapley vector 
values, the percentages are as follows: 
𝑃(𝐴) =  7%  𝑃(𝐵) =  0% 𝑃(𝐶) =   % 
 
The percentages of financial services, 
consumer products and services, and 
telecommunications and media sectors are 37%, 40% 




 general election 
   (0.00 6   0.00 568 0.00 558) 
 
The results for Shapley value for player A 
(financial services sector), player B (consumer products 
and services sector) and player C (telecommunications 
and media sector) are 0.004623, 0.004568 and 0.003558 
respectively. As normalisation of the Shapley vector 
values, the percentages are as follows: 
𝑃(𝐴) =  6%  𝑃(𝐵) =  6% 𝑃(𝐶) =  8% 
 
The percentages of financial services, 
consumer products and services, and 
telecommunications and media sectors are 36%, 36% 
and 28% respectively in GE14 period. 
 
 
Fig-1: Percentages of sectoral changes during GE13 and GE14 
 
The bar graph represents the percentage 
comparison between two periods of general elections in 
Malaysia with three types of sectors in 2013 and 2018. 
In GE13, the best strategy is 37% from the financial 
services sector, 40% from consumer products and 
services sector, and 23% from the telecommunications 
and media sector. In contrast, during GE14, the best 
strategy is 36% from both the financial services and 
consumer products and services sectors, and 28% from 
telecommunications and media. Financial services 
decreased its share very slightly from 37% during 
GE13, to provide 36% in the next 5 years. The 
consumer products and services sector have the highest 
percentage although it decreased from 40% in GE13 to 
36% in GE14. The telecommunications and media 
sector in increased its proportion to 28% in 2018 from 
23% during the previous general election. All sectors 
except telecommunications and media showed a 
decrease in percentage in coalition after the new 
government ruled the country for 6 months. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Game theory is one of the solutions to decision 
making problems. Based on the Shapley value, the 
sectoral strategy changes after GE14 in Malaysia were 
compared to GE13. It has been demonstrated that there 
is an impact from the political changes on the market. 
The study can be further used to suggest an optimal 
portfolio selection to investors when political changes 
occur. 
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